The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

 

                    7-8월 두 달간 틈틈이 읽었던 책. 애당초 완독을 목표로 하지는 않았는데, 당분간 이 책을 더 읽을 겨를은 없을 것 같아 우선 갈무리 하는 걸로. 책에서는 인간과 조직의 본성을 크게 세 측면에서 조망한다. 제한된 합리성(Bounded Rationality), 기회주의(Opportunism), 자산 특유성(Asset Specificity). 윌리엄슨은 이 각각의 측면에서 인간(그리고 조직)의 계약적(contratual)인 속성을 분석한다. 그 다음 '기업'이라는 조직을 시장이라는 분석틀에서 이해해오던 종래의 관점을 탈피해, 거래비용(transaction cost)이라는 분석틀을 통해 기업에 내재된 (또는 필요한) 거버넌스적 요소들을 설명한다. Paribus Ceteris라는 전제가 자주 등장하기 때문에 다소 추상적이고 이론적인 설명이지만, 공공재 활용을 둘러싼 시장과 정부의 관계에 대해 생각해볼 거리는 있을 것 같다. 절반쯤 읽은 것으로 만족하기는 아쉬운 책이지만, 일단은 이쯤에서 덮어야 할 것 같다'-'

 

 

                    James Buchanan has argued that “economics comes closer to being a ‘science of contract’ than a ‘science of choice’ [on which account] the maximizer must be replaced by the arbitrator, the outsider who tries to work out compromises among conflicting claims”(1975, p.229).

—p. 29

 

                    Thus it is the condition of asset specificity that distinguishes the competitive and governance contracting models. Contract as competition works well where asset specificity is negligible.

—p. 42

 

                    Joined as they are in a condition of bilateral monopoly, both buyer and seller are strategically situated to bargain over the disposition of any incremental gain whenever a proposal to adapt is made by the other party. Although both have a long-term interest in effecting adaptations of a joint posit-maximizing kind, each also has an interest in appropriating as much of the gain as he can on each occasion to adapt.

—p. 63

 

                    Power theory must confront two troublesome facts in explaining those changes. First, why would the general purpose and later the special purpose merchants ever permit economic activity to be organized in ways that removed power from their control? Second, why did power leak out selectively—with the merchant role being appropriated extensively by some types of manufacturers but not by others? As developed above, the transaction cost approach explains both in terms of efficiency.

—p. 124

 

                    As firm size increases and successive levels of organization are added, therefore, the effects of control loss eventually exceed the gains.

—p. 134

 

                    Our first explanation for why firms do not everywhere supplant markets thus is that (1) firms cannot mimic the high-powered incentives of markets without experiencing added costs; (2) although recourse by firms to lower-powered incentives is thereby indicated, that too comes at a cost; and (3) those added costs of internal organization are not offset by comparative adaptability gains under circumstances where k=0, since those are precisely the conditions under which the identity of the parties does not matter, whence classical market contracting works well.

—p. 140

 

                    Thus although it is useful to think of markets and hierarchies as alternative modes with many common features, it is also essential to recognize that distinctive strengths and weaknesses are associated with each. Both incentive and governance features have to be acknowledged. As compared with internal transactions, market mediated transactions rely more on high-powered incentives and less on the administrative process (including auditing) to accomplish the same result. 

—p. 162