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런던의 금융중심지, 시티구역의 풍경/Independent

 

What Brexit will do to the City of London

The damage will be noticeable but not disastrous

Oct 24th 2020, from <Economist>

 

 

 

 

In the 2000s London threatened to knock New York off its perch as the world’s top financial centre. Today things look different. Brexit has robbed the City of London, the capital’s financial district, of much of its swagger. World-conquering ambition has given way to anxious defensiveness.

                    2000년대 런던은 세계금융의 중심으로서 뉴욕의 지위를 위협했었다. 오늘날 상황은 좀 달라졌다. 브렉시트로 인해 런던의 시티 일대(런던의 금융지역)은 활기를 잃었다. 세계를 호령하던 런던의 야심은 불안에 찬 방어적인 태도로 바뀌었다.

 

When the post-Brexit transition period ends and Britain leaves the single market on December 31st, financial links with the EU will become, in the words of its new financial-services chief, Mairead McGuinness, “less fluid.” British-registered financial firms will lose the “passporting” rights that have long allowed them to sell funds, debt, advice or insurance to clients across the EU unimpeded, as if they were domestic.

                    브렉시트 이후 이행기간이 끝나고 영국이 12월 31일자로 단일시장을 떠나면, 영국과 EU의 재정적 관계는 덜 유동적이게 된다. 영국 기반의 금융회사들은 패스포팅 권한(EU 전역의 고객들에게 펀드, 부채, 자문, 보험을 자국 시장처럼 방해받지 않고 팔 수 있는 권리)을 잃는다.

 

Brexiteers argue that a City cut free from the EU’s red tape can be a more outward-looking entrepot, with strengthened links to the rest of the world. For now, though, the headlines are all about what London is set to lose.

                    브렉시트 옹호자들(Brexiteers)은 영국 금융이 EU의 각종 규제로부터 자유로워지고 세계의 다른 지역과의 연결을 강화함으로써 역외(outward-looking) 거래의 중심지가 될 것이라 주장한다. 하지만 현재로서는 영국이 잃게 될 것들이 언론을 장식하고 있다.

 

 

영국의 현 총리 보리스 존슨은 브렉시트에 대해 강경한 지지 입장을 보이고 있다, 언론인 출신 정치인으로서 이미지메이킹에도 매우 능한 인물

 

 

This jolt comes after two decades during which London became the increasingly muscular heart of the EU’s financial body. Banks are natural consolidators, and many sought to do as much of their European business as possible from London.

                    이러한 격풍(jolt)은 런던이 EU의 금융공동체에서 아주 강력한 구심점이 된 지 20년이 지나서 온 것이다. 은행은 생래적으로 통합을 도모하는 기관(colsolidator)으로서, 많은 은행들이 런던에서 유럽의 사업들을 진행해 왔다.

 

As a result, London became the overwhelmingly dominant EU hub in international finance, and Britain a big net exporter of financial services, with a ￡44bn surplus in 2017. The sector’s share of GDP has grown, despite slipping back a bit after the financial crisis of 2007-09. This activity is a big generator of tax revenue: financial-services firms pay around ￡75bn a year, or more than 10% of all tax receipts.

                    그 결과 런던은 국제금융에서 EU의 명실상부한 허브가 되었고 영국은 금융서비스의 순수출로 2017년 한해 440억파운드(한화 약 65조 원)의 흑자를 거뒀다. 금융서비스가 국내총생산에서 차지하는 비중도 2007~09년도 금융위기에 주춤했음에도 불구하고 증가해 왔다. 금융활동은 세수의 큰 창출원으로서 금융기업들은 해마다 750억 파운드(한화 110조원), 즉 모든 세수의 10% 수준을 지불한다.

 

It might seem odd, then, that since the Brexit vote in 2006 governments have not considered the City a priority. But its support for Remain did not endear it to the Brexiteers who now run Britain—and who know that there are more votes in protecting fishermen than moneymen. Financial services are not part of the trade deal being negotiated with Brussels.

                    그렇다면 2006년 브렉시트가 투표에 부쳐졌을 때 영국정부가 금융산업을 우선순위에 두지 않은 것은 이상해 보일 것이다. 하지만 EU 잔류를 옹호했던 정치인들은 현재 국정을 운영하고 있는 브렉시트 옹호자(이들은 금융업자들보다도 어업에 종사하는 사람들을 지킴으로써 얻는 표가 더 많다는 것을 안다)들에게 호응을 얻어내지 못했다. (결과적으로) 금융서비스는 EU와 협상할 때 협상의 대상이 아니었던 것이다.

 

As a result, any deal on financial services is likely to be “very thin, a sort of ‘No Deal Plus’”, says William Wright of New Financial, a think-tank.

                    이에 따라 금융서비스에 관해서는 아무 협상도 없다시피(No Deal Plus) 했다. 

 

 

당시 투표결과를 보아도 알 수 있듯이 인구 비중이 가장 높은 잉글랜드 지역에서 탈퇴에 대한 의견이 강하게 표출되었다, 상황이 이렇다 보니 잉글랜드로부터 독립하려는 스코틀랜드의 움직임은 현재 진행형이다

 

 

Britain was quick to grant EU financial firms access on existing terms for three years, after which they can seek longer-term “authorisation”. This was not reciprocated. With passporting gone, the best that British firms can hope for in the EU is “equivalence”—a poor substitute. This would allow British firms to serve EU clients only if Brussels deemed British regulations to be closely aligned with its own. 

                    영국은 서둘러 EU의 금융기업들에게 현행 조약을 3년까지도 허용하여 더 오랜 기간 권한을 누릴 수 있게 했지만, EU로부터의 화답은 없었다. ‘패스포팅’이 폐지되면, 영국 기업들이 EU에 기대할 수 있는 것은 형편없는 대체물, 즉 ‘형평주의(equivalence; 거래의 조건들이 일대일 대응이 되는지 꼼꼼히 따진다는 의미)’이다. 이는 영국기업들이 EU의 거래 조항들과 상응할 경우에만 EU의 고객을 상대할 수 있도록 할 것이다.

 

Worse, the EU seems minded to offer relatively unfettered access only in areas where not doing so could affect its own financial stability, such as critical market infrastructure. It has thus agreed to extend current arrangements for clearing euro-denomiated derivatives, an activity dominated by London-based clearing houses. The EU is determined to build its own clearing capacity to reduce “excessive” reliance on British financial plumbing—though, as Sir Douglas Flint, chairman of Standard Life Aberdeen, a British fund manager, points out, how the 27 countries would share the risks of backstopping it remains to be seen. Tellingly, the London Clearing House’s(LCH’s) share of euro-swaps clearing has remained above 90% since the Brexit referendum, despite efforts by Eurex, a Frankfurt rival, to nab market share. 

                    더욱 심각한 것은, EU가 엄격히 규제하는 것이 금융 안정에 영향을 미칠 만한 영역(예컨대 중추적인 시장인프라)에 한해서만 상대적으로 느슨하게 접근을 허용하는 데 관심을 보이는 것 같다는 점이다. 그리하여 유로화로 발행된 파생상품을 교환하는 현재의 합의를 연장하기로 하였는데, 이는 런던의 어음교환소가 지배해왔던 금융활동이다. EU는 영국금융에 대한 지나친 의존을 줄이고자 자체적인 어음교환 역량을 갖추기로 결정했다. 그렇지만 EU의 27개국이 이에 수반되는 리스크를 어떻게 분산할지는 지켜봐야 한다. 강력하게도 LCH(런던 어음교환소)의 유로스왑 교환 비중은, 시장을 뺏어오려는 프랑크푸르트의 경쟁자 Eurex의 노력에도 불구하고 브렉시트 국민 투표 이후인 지금도 시장의 90%를 상회한다.

 

 

패터노스터 광장에 자리한 런던 증권거래소

 

 

For many other activities, the level of access starting on January 1st remains unresolved. That is not least because the EU is using equivalence as a bargaining chip in the trade talks. European regulators are yet to decide, for instance, whether EU investors will be able to trade EU-listed stocks on British exchanges. The London Stock Exchange(LSE) says it will offer trading of EU-listed shares on the Dutch trading platform it owns if necessary.

                    그밖에 다른 여러 활동들에 관해서, 내년도 1월 1일부터 어느 정도의 접근이 허용될지에 대해서는 해결되지 않은 채로 있다. 이는 단지 EU가 형평주의를 협상의 도구로 쓰고 있기 때문만은 아니다. 가령 유럽의 규제 당국은 EU 투자자들이 EU에 상장된 주식들을 영국 주식시장에서 거래할 것인지에 대해 결정하지 못한 상태다. 런던 증권거래소(LSE)는 필요하다면 EU에 상장된 주식들을 네덜란드의 거래소에서 거래하겠다고 밝혔다.

 

In several key areas, equivalence has been all but ruled out. One is investment-banking sales and trading. Another is retail banking. 

                    여러 핵심적인 영역에서, 형평주의는 거의 반영되지 못했다. 그 중 하나는 투자은행의 판매와 거래다. 또 다른 하나는 소액은행업무다.

 

Fund managers have another worry, related to “delegation”, the outsourcing model at the heart of the €8trn European fund industry. Thousands of funds are domiciled in places like Luxembourg or Dublin for tax or regulatory reasons, but are permitted to be managed from London, New York or Hong Kong. The EU’s markets authority recently cast doubt on this arrangement, suggesting it may be reviewed. This has caused consternation in Britain—whose fund managers oversee ￡8.5trn of assets, ￡2.1trn of which sit in EU-domiciled funds—and elsewhere.

                    펀드 매니저로서는 8조 유로(한화 1,600조 원)에 달하는 유럽의 편드시장에서 아웃소싱 업무, 즉 대행업무와 관련해 또 다른 걱정거리가 있다. 수많은 펀드들이 세금이나 규제상의 이유로 룩셈부르크와 아일랜드에 소재지를 등록해두고 있지만, 런던, 뉴욕또는 홍콩에서 관할하도록 되어 있다. 그런데 EU의 정부기관들은 최근 이들 합의가 재검토될 필요가 있다며 의문을 제기했다. 이는 펀드 사업가들이 8.5조 파운드(한화 1경 2,500조 원)(이 가운데 3,100조 원 규모가 EU에 근거지를 두고 있다)의 자산을 관리하고 있는 영국에서 논란을 지폈다.

 

 

브렉시트 결정 이후 총리직을 맡았던 테레사 메이 총리('16~'19)와 분주한 협상장의 모습

 

 

The jobs toll

Brussels has always been clear what Brexit would mean if Britain left the single market: if you want to serve EU clients, as a rule it should be done from within the bloc. Its motives are complex. Playing tough is partly to do with deterring others from leaving the EU. It is also about regaining “economic sovereignty”. Some EU regulators worry about the implications for financial stability of having to rely on a third country for critical functions. Others see Brexit as a chance to renew the push for “capital-markets union”, a long-stalled project to deepen and integrate the EU’s fragmented markets, thereby lowering the cost of capital. And there is raw opportunism. “It does seem to me that some in the EU are seeking to weaponise the equivalence decisions for the UK as a third country in order to shift trading volumes in particular into the EU27.” Says Kay Swinburne, vice-chair of financial services at KPMG’s British arm, and former MEP.

                    EU는 영국이 단일시장을 떠날 경우 브렉시트가 무엇을 의미하는지 명확히 해왔다. EU의 고객을 상대하기를 원한다면, 원칙적으로 블록 안에서 행하라는 것이다. 이 취지는 다소 복잡하다. EU의 단호한 입장은 부분적으로 다른 국가들이 EU에서 이탈하는 것을 막기 위함이다. 이는 또한 ‘경제 주권‘을 되찾기 위한 것이기도 하다. 몇몇 EU의 규제 당국은 핵심적인 기능들을 제3국에 의존하는 것과 관련하여 금융 안정성이 내포하는 의미에 관하 우려를 표하기도 한다. 또 다른 이들은 브렉시트를 EU 역내의 분산된 시장으로 인해 오랬동안 지연되어 왔던 ‘자본시장 통합’의 동력을 다시 마련하고 자본비용을 낮출 수 있는 기회로 보고 있다. 그리고 순전히 기회주의도 공존한다. EU의 몇몇 국가들은 거래규모를 EU 27개국으로 옮겨오기 위해 영국에 대한 형평주의를 무기화하고 있다.

 

EU regulators have made it clear that they want to see “substance” in EU subsidiaries. Banks are under pressure to move not just back-office staff but salespeople, traders and risk managers too. “Keeping the key staff in London, with a brass-plate operation across the water, is out,” says a British regulator. According to EY’s Brexit Tracker, which monitors announcements by large banks and other financial firms, as of October 1st at least 7,500 jobs had left the City for the EU since the referendum. On top if this, firms have added, or plan to over 2,800 new roles in EU subsidiaries. 

                    EU의 규제 당국들은 영국기업의 EU 지점에 대한 ‘실질적인 면‘을 확인하고 싶다는 점은 분명히 했다. 은행들은 백오피스뿐만 아니라, 영업직, 트레이더, 리스크 매니저들까지 지점으로 옮기라는 압박에 처해 있다. “명패는 해협 건너에 걸어두고 핵심요직을 런던에 두던 방식은 끝났다.” 10월 1일 기준으로 적어도 7천 5백 개의 일자리가 국민투표 이후 시티 지역에서 EU로 옮겼다. 이에 더해 기업들은 2천 8백 개의 일자리를 EU 지점으로 옮기려는 계획을 내놓고 있다.

 

 

런던의 시티지역을 떠난 일자리들이 암스테르담으로 몰려든다?

 

 

These lost jobs add up to around 4% of the total in the City—hardly a devastating blow. But the actual number moving is higher; EY tracks only the 222 largest firms. And there is more to come. Hubertus Vath of Frankfurt Main Finance, the city’s financial cheerleader, says that in 2019 some 1,500 finance jobs moved form London to Germany’s financial capital. He expect another 2,000 to transfer as the pandemic fades.

                    이렇게 사라지는 일자리가 시티 지역에 다해서 약 4%라고 하는 것이 파괴적인 수준은 아니다. 하지만 오로지 상위 222개기업에 대한 결과이므로 실제 수치는 더 높을 것이다. 2019년 1천 5백 개의 금융업 일자리가 런던에서 독일로 옮겨 갔다. 팬데믹의 여파와 겹쳐 추가적으로 2천 개의 일자리가 더 옮겨갈 것으로 보인다. (영국은 유럽에서 코로나로 인해 가장 심각한 타격을 입은 국가 중 한 곳인 반면, 독일은 양호하게 방역하고 있다.)

 

Mr Wright estimates that around 90% of the big Wall Street banks’ European staff were based in London before Brexit, and expects the number to have fallen to 80% by the time the dust settles. How much of the reduction is down to covid-induced downsizing and the rise of home working, as opposed to Brexit, is unclear.

                    브렉시트 이전에는 월 가의 은행에 소속된 유럽직원 90%가 런던에 있었지만, 그 수치는 사태가 진정세에 접어들면 80%까지 내려갈 것으로 보인다. 브렉시트와는 반대로, 이러한 감소세가 코로나로 인한 긴축과 재택근무 증가에 어떤 영향을 받는지는 불명확하다.

 

As for assets, banks have announced the shifting of ￡1.2trn-worth, equivalent to 14% of British-based banks’ total assets, in preparation for Brexit; more may have been moved unannounced. Nicoals Beron of Bruegel, a think-tank, reckons that more than 20% of British banking assets could eventually go.

                    자산 측면에서 은행들은 브렉시트에 대비하여 1.2조 파운드(한화 1,800조 원) 가치의 자산을 이동시키겠다고 발표했는데, 이는 영국에서 소재한 은행 총자산의 14%에 달한다. 20% 이상의 은행자산이 빠져나갈 것으로 예측되는 상황이다.

 

 

영국은 유럽에서 코로나로 인해 가장 많은 인명피해가 발생했다, 이로 인해 브렉시트 협상도 영향을 받고 있다

 

 

Barclays is transferring ￡150bn—over 10% of its domestic balancesheet—to Ireland, making it the largest bank there. JP Morgan Chase is moving €200bn, over 7% of its global assets, to Germany. Lost business means lost tax revenue: Stephen Jones of UK Finance, a lobby group, told a House of Lords committee in February that of the ￡37bn-38bn that banks contribute directly and indirectly to the Exchequer, ￡3bn-5bn is “at risk”.

                    바클레이는 1,500억 파운드(한화 220조 원; 자국 재정의 10% 이상)을 아일랜드에 옮김으로써 가장 큰 은행을 두기로 했다. JP 모건 체이스는 2,000억 유로(한화 265조 원; 전세계 자산의 7%)를 독일에 유치하기로 했다. 사라지는 금융업은 곧 세수의 감소를 의미한다. 

 

Estimating the final toll is guesswork. New Financial reckons that a quarter of the City’s business in EU-linked and half of that may have to relocate. A similar lack of clarity hangs over the City’s ￡55bn-65bn in revenue from other parts of the world. No one knows what proportion of that is routed through London only because of its soon-to-disappear frictionless access to the EU.

                    최종적으로 얼마나 대가를 치르게 될지는 미지수이다. 시티 금융업의 4분의 1이 EU와 연관되어 있으며 이 가운데 절반은 재조정되어야 한다는 예측도 있다. 비슷한 불투명성은 시티가 그밖의 외국에서 벌어들이는 5,500~6,500파운드(한화 810조~960조)의 수익에도 해당된다. 그동안 지장없이 EU에 접근할 수 있었던 것이 곧 불가능해지면서 얼마만큼의 비율이 런던을 거쳐 왔는지는 아무도 모른다.

 

 

다시 런던의 시티 구역으로

 

 

The City still has charms.

Despite Brexit, London retains several advantages over EU financial centres, from its language and legal system (which governs many financial contracts) to the rich corporate ecosystem of lawyers, accountant, consultants and public-relations experts entwined with the City. London is also—no small matter—the worldliest of the continent’s world cities.

                    브렉시트에도 불구하고 런던은 EU의 금융중심지보다 여러 면에서 장점을 가지고 있다. 언어에서부터 법체계, 거기에다 변호사, 회계사, 컨설턴트 그리고 공무를 다룰 줄 아는 시티 내의 전문가까지 아우르는 풍부한 기업 생태계에 이르기까지. 게다가 런던은 대륙의 세계적인 도시들보다도 더욱 세계적인 면모를 갖고 있다.

 

This makes it attractive not just to big banks, but also to hundreds of smaller firms that “see advantages Paris and Frankfurt struggle to reproduce”, says Daniel Pinto, the Anglo-French founder of Stanhope Capital, a boutique investment firm. Paris, he says, is still seen as “wanting to penalise, not promote, the financial sector”, despite its strenuous efforts to woo business from London. Moreover, London is streets ahead of European rivals in several fast-growing sectors, such as green finance and fintechs. 

                    이는 대형 은행들에게뿐만 아니라 이를 재현해보고자 하는 파리와 프랑크푸르트에서 강점을 찾는 수백 개의 작은 기업들에게도 매력적이다. 파리는 런던에서 기업들을 데려오기 위해 집요하게 구애하고 있음에도 불구하고 금융 부문을 활성화시키기보다는 규제하는 편이다. 게다가 런던은 유럽대륙의 경쟁자들보다 친환경 금융이나 핀테크와 같은 여러 급성장하는 부문에서 한 걸음 앞서 있다.

 

 

본문에 언급되는 지표는 Global Financil Center Index를 말하는 듯하다, 해마다 아시아의 성장세가 두드러지고 있다

 

 

Regulation might also be an advantage in the future. Some worry that standards may be allowed to sip to boost Britain’s competitiveness. The Bank of England rejects this (one of its mantras is “divergence doesn’t necessarily mean dilution”). It stresses a change in style rather than substance: making rules smarter by letting regulators, rather than lawmakers more detached from the industry, craft more of them. Improving on the EU’s one-size-fits-all-27 financial rule book is not the most fiendish of challenges. The aim is to rewrite it so it is “more open to innovation while no less attentive to financial stability”, says a British official. Ms Swinburne expects Britain to seek to align regulation more closely with American and Asia.

                    규제는 미래에 장점이 될 수도 있다. 몇몇 사람들은 기준들이 영국의 경쟁력을 갉아먹을 것이라 우려한다. 영국은행은 늘상 ‘차이가 희석을 의미하지 않는다‘고 말해왔듯이 이를 반박한다. 그러면서 실질적인 내용이 달라진다기보다는 스타일이 바뀐다는 점을 강조한다. 즉 입법자들이 산업에서 동떨어지기보다는 규제당국이 규정을 짜도록 함으로써 더 스마트한 규정을 만드는것이다. 27개국을 EU라는 하나의 틀 안에 규정하는 것은 대단히 골치 아픈 일이다. 금융 안정성을 소홀히 하지 않으면서 혁신에 개방적인 규정을 새로이 만드는 것이 EU의 목표다. 이에 따라 영국은 미국 및 아시아와 더욱 긴밀이 규정을 조율해야 한다는 의견도 있다.

 

The EU, meanwhile, suffers from a lack of cohesion. The huge variation in tis member states’ tax and insolvency laws is a formidable barrier to creating a unified capital market, for instance. The bloc is also riven with division over what type of financial sovereignty it wants. “It’s a delicate balancing act. The more it wraps its arms around EU borders and says activity has to take place within them, the less competitive and less connected to global flows its financial services will be, and costs will rise,” says Andrew Pilgrim of EY. 

                    한편 EU는 결속력 부족으로 곤란한 상황이다. 세금과 도산법에 관한 회원국간의 편차는 통합 자본시장을 형성하는 데 강력한 걸림돌이다. 블록은 또한 각자가 어떤 형태의 ‘경제 주권‘을 바라는가에 관해서도 분열되어 있다. EU의 국경을 감싸고그 안에서 경제활동이 이루어져야 한다고 할 수록, 경쟁력은 더 줄어들고 EU의 금융서비스는 글로벌 트렌트와 유리될 것이다. 이는 비용의 증가를 의미한다.

  

Also hamstringing the EU is a lack of co-ordination in taking on London. Its financial centres compete with each other. As a result, expertise is diffuse: Frankfurt is strong in banking; Amsterdam in trading platforms; Luxembourg and Dublin in fund administration; Paris comes closest to being an all-rounder but is far from world-class. 

                    EU를 가로막는 또 하나는 런던을 대체하기 위한 합동대응이 부족하다는 점이다. 각국의 금융중심지는 서로 경쟁을 하고 있다. 결과적으로 각 금융중심지의 전문성은 분산되어 있다. 프랑크푸르트는 은행업에, 암스테르담은 무역 플랫폼에, 룩셈부르크와 더블린은 펀드 관리에. 파리는 모든 것을 아우르고는 있지만 세계적인 수준에 이르지는 못하고 있다.

 

 

TSCG(Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance): III. 정부의 예산 적자 제한 IV. 공공부채 제한 // Banking Union: 유럽중앙은행의 관할 여부

 

 

There are also questions over banks’ longer-term commitment to a Britainless EU. They are being forced to relocate business against their will. It does not help that the EU 27’s share of global banking, insurance and capital-markets activity has been falling since before the global financial crisis: from 20% in 2006 to 13%, while America’s share has remained stable at around 40% and Asia’s has jumped from 18% to 28%. 

                    영국이 빠진 EU에서 은행들이 장기적으로 참여할지도 의문이다. 은행들은 그들의 의사와 상관 없이 강제적으로 위치를 옮기고 있다. 그렇다고 해서 EU가 글로벌 금융위기 이전까지만 해도 20%를 점유했던 은행업, 보험업, 그리고 자본시장 활동이 13%까지 내려앉은 상황에 보탬이 되는 것도 아니다. 같은 기간 미국의 지분은 40% 대에서 비슷한 수준을 유지했고, 아시아는 18%에서 28%로 껑충 뛰었다.

 

Some bankers may find ways around the diktat that they serve EU clients from within the bloc. The LCH has suggested that, faced with “forced fragmentation”, some firms might try “to reroute trades via different entities”. A central banker says: “Never underestimate the financial sectors ability to do the business it wants, where it wants, despite regulators putting lines on maps. Arbitrage is in its DNA.”

                    몇몇 은행들은 강제적인 조치를 우회하여 블록내에서 EU를 상대할 수 있는 방안을 찾을 것이다. 강제된 분리(forced fragmentation)를 마주하여 몇몇 기업들은 다른 기관을 거쳐 무역을 새로이 편성하고자 할 것이다. 지리적인 경계를 그어놓는 규제 당국에도 불구하고 금융업은 그들이 원하는 것과 원하는 곳을 두고 사업을 벌일 역량이 있다는 것을 과소평가해서는 안 된다. 차익거래(Arbitrage)는 거스를 수 없는 것이다.

 

 

영국을 강력하게 압박하는 EU, 그 중심에는 EU 역내에서 가장 탄탄한 경제력을 가진 독일이 있다

 

 

Even if London says well ahead of European wannabes, however, it faces intense competition from elsewhere. It remains locked in a battle with New York for top spot. Asian markets are growing fast and becoming more self-sufficient in raising capital. China has hosted more of the IPO boom of 2020 than London, partly thanks to its fast-growing, Nasdaq-style market for tech stocks. “The big risk for London is not the EU but that in the not too distant future Asia doesn’t need it,” says Mr Wright.

                    런던이 유럽 다른 국가들이 따르고 싶어하는 모델이라고는 하지만, 다른 곳에서 강력한 도전에 직면해 있다. 뉴욕과는 세계 최고를 두고 여전히 다투고 있는 상황이다. 아시아 시장은 급성장했고 자본을 자체적으로 조달할 수 있는 수준이다. 중국은 빠른 경제성장과 기술주에 대한 나스닥 스타일의 시장 덕택에 2020년 런던보다도 더욱 많이 주식 상장(Initial Public Offering)이 이루어졌다. 런던에게 가장 큰 리스크는 EU가 아니라 가까운 미래에 아시아 시장이 더 이상 런던을 필요로 하지 않을 것이라는 사실이다.

 

The full impact of Brexit won’t be clear for years. Large parts of the future relationship between the City and the EU will be thrashes out only at the end of temporary extensions, such as that for clearing, says Simon Cleeson of Clifford Chance, a law firm. In the meantime, technology, along with covid-19 and home-working, is making the question of location-based regulation, long fundamental in finance, increasingly vexed. All of which, says Jan Putnis of Slaughter and May, another law firm, “makes Brexit look almost quaint”.

                    브렉시트의 전체적인 영향은 몇 년간은 명확하지 않을 것이다. 영국 금융과 EU간 향후 관계의 큰 부분은 임시 연장기간의 말미에나 검토될(thrashed out) 것이다. 다른 한편, 기술의 발달은 코로나로 인한 재택 근무의 확산과 더불어 금융의 근간을 이루던 지역 기반의 규제에 관한 문제들을 더욱 까다롭게 만들고 있다. 이러한 모든 요인들이 브렉시트를 진풍경(quaint)으로 만들고 있다.

 

 

전야의 런던